Conclusions we can draw from historical evidence. A response to William Lane Craig’s failed reasoning.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AjOSNj97_gk

and the transcript if you like http://www.philvaz.com/apologetics/p96.htm

Watch the video above or read the transcript, or really see any of his debates, and you will have enough background to understand the purpose of this essay. People, even with P.h.D’s in philosophy and expertise in their field of study, use bad reasoning glossed over with a veneer of seeming plausability to convince people of irrational ways of understanding the world. Hopefully, I can expose some of this bad reasoning

When talking about the historicity of the event of Jesus’s resurrection, Dr Craig commonly cites 4 facts that he claims are independently verified and accepted among current scholars and experts on this particular subject of historical study. I am willing to grant this point, as it is his conclusion resulting from these facts, namely that it is most reasonable to conclude that Jesus rose from the dead, that is terribly flawed. I think most people of a skeptical mindset have an innate sense as to why this is so, but I have never come across a thorough explanation that did not require a philosophical background to understand. I will attempt to elucidate the reasons why it is unreasonable to make Dr. Craig’s conclusion, and explain the conditions under which it necessary to reach the conclusion he reaches. I will begin with a somewhat rough treatment of what separates some assertions from others, in regard to the level of certainty we can ascribe to them.

For any assertion we can make there is a corresponding degree of certainty that is attached to that statement. It is also reasonable, in the interest of truth, that the degree of certainty we attach to any particular assertion correlates in equal measure to the evidence in support of that assertion. If we were to represent this on a scale, an assertion would fall somewhere between absolutely certain and absolutely false, with these polar extremes being largely illustrative as they are, in reality, unobtainable. Even the strongest assertions of science cannot be fully spared from doubt. Indeed, it is the assiduous application of doubt that keeps these assertions strong. On the opposite end, as long as there is some mystery left in the world there is no assertion that we can fully discount.

Scientific assertions, being the most rigorously tested in controlled settings, and as such fully vulnerable to destruction by inconsistent facts, populate the upper echelons of this scale. This is reasonable, as scientific assertions have a community of devoted thinkers and experimenters constantly endeavoring to test and overthrow them. It is also a testament to the strength of these assertions that they have transformed our society and enlarged our powers in such meaningful and readily tangible ways.

Historical assertions occupy a lower echelon, as they deal with events that are inherently unrepeatable, and with evidence, such as witness testimony, that is often unreliable and tainted by the biases of both the recorder of historical events and the individual investigating them. That is not to say that scientific assertions are not tainted by bias as well, but scientists study events that are often repeatedly occurring, and are able to design experiments with the explicit intention of minimizing or removing the biases of the investigator. They have much more control over the conditions under which they encounter information, and because of this, can draw much stronger conclusions.

However, while assertions regarding historical truth are less certain than scientific assertions, they are still reasonable to believe lacking other, more evidenced claims. We find it perfectly reasonable to believe that Julius Caesar existed, based entirely off of historical evidence. But here we come to the crux of the issue at hand. When examining historical events, or supposed events, why should some, perhaps appealing to respected historians of the time, be taken as reasonable to believe, while others with seemingly equal amounts of evidence or eyewitness testimony, and sometimes appealing to other respected historians with differing opinions, be regarded as apocryphal?

Now, I am not a historian, and do not claim expertise in the examination and evaluation of historical evidence according to respected standards. However, there is one way by which historical evidence can be examined which does not require expertise in the specific methods of historical examination. The sciences of physics, chemistry, and biology make assertions about how our world behaves; assertions which are evidenced to a much higher degree of certainty than can be achieved by historical evidence alone. In the case where a historical event is said to have taken place that is countered by scientific evidence that asserts that it could not have happened as it has been represented to have happened, according to known processes of chemistry, biology, and physics, then it is unreasonable to believe this event took place.

That is not to say that these things cannot happen, or that the event did not happen as described. Science does not make absolutely certain conclusions, there is always room for doubt. This means only that current scientific conclusions are more reasonable to be believed than conclusions based solely off of historical evidence. According to the current known processes of chemistry and biology, the cascade of cellular destruction and the progressive disorganization of a very particularly organized biological organism, a process we call death, cannot be reversed, and it is unreasonable to believe at this time that it can. This would also include the miracles of Christ, the actions Greek gods, or any other witnessed phenomena of this nature. Even if one were to say that resurrection was possible, the method of establishing this would not be in plowing through historical accounts, and there are numerous ones, where it has been claimed to have occurred; it would be in a laboratory, under controlled settings, and one would have to particularly describe how it occurs.

The only time it would be reasonable to reach Dr. Craig’s conclusion is if one previously believed that things like resurrection can and have occurred. Does Dr. Craig explain how the resurrection occurred? He must bring in another actor, God, a being of infinite power, who does it by a process we know nothing about. His position that his conclusion is reasonable on its own grounds is dishonest. It is only reasonable if one previously assumes the existence of a powerful being with both the ability and desire to perform a resurrection. It’s interesting to carry on this method of reasoning. As it is reasonable, in Dr. Craig’s opinion, to assume the existence of all-powerful beings as explanations for historical accounts of a supernatural nature, it is also reasonable to believe other accounts of supernatural happenings for which there are multiple, independent sources or witnesses claiming they have occurred, and for which we lack other, similarly evidenced explanations. Indeed, the chief reason Dr. Craig argues that it is reasonable to conclude as he does is that no one else, at the time people were declaring that a miracle had occurred, advanced an alternative explanation for Craig’s four facts, and because of this an alternative explanation must be made up by modern historians, something that gives Dr. Craig adequate fodder for rebuttal and the position that seemingly has the more credible claim.

However, we all know that historical accounts must be edited for fantastical claims. The people writing these accounts lived thousands of years ago, and believed all kinds of incredible things. We do this all the time when reading the accounts of the actions of Greek or Roman gods, or the insights into the afterlife given by Egyptian priests. We don’t put coins in the eyes of deceased loved ones to pay Charon to ferry their spirits across the river Styx because of this. Curiously, it is only in regard to historical events that would be uncomfortable for us to deny that we forget this fact, and our amnesia passes as quickly as we pass to areas where we wield our skepticism more comfortably.